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PART I 
An Introduction to Game Theory- 
Game theory, or the theory of games of strategy is a 
relatively new field in mathematics.    Very little was said about 
this theory prior to 19W* and the appearance of The Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. 
Since that time, both theoretical and practical aspects of the 
theory have been developed, and applications ranging from economic 
problems to warfare have been investigated. 
The theory of linear programming, dealing with maximizing and 
minimizing problems, has been applied to  the solution of games of 
strategy.    Most often,  however,  the applications of the theory 
involve such extensive computation that automatic computers are 
required for solution. 
Pure games of chance have no place in game theory.    The game 
theorist is concerned only with games of strategy or decision 
making on the part of rational players.    This is not to say that 
chance may not play an important role in a game of strategy. 
Poker is a prime example of a game where chance determines how 
the cards are dealt, and decision making, how the game will go. 
Indeed, a player's own choices are often determined by some chance 
1 
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device that he uses. 
In the material written on the subject, the theory of games 
has been developed from two standpoints:    l) in a language as 
mathematically rigorous as possible, with a thorough theoretical 
approach, and with applications involving this rigorous system, 
and 2) in a more intuitive manner, also with applications to 
practical problems, but in a more informal presentation.    In this 
paper,  the purpose of which is to provide an introduction to the 
thecry of games sufficiently complete to make understanding of 
the applications cf linear programming to some original games 
possible, a combination of the two approaches will be used. 
Intuitively speaking, a particular game is all of the rules 
of which it is made.    It is a sequence of rational moves on the 
part of players, a move being the occasion of a choice between 
alternatives.    Usually games are played for some end, and it is 
important in game theory to make all rewards in terms of money, 
that is, to arrange a payoff for winners and losers at the end 
cf seme specified sequence of moves. 
There are several features common to any game.    First, there 
must be at least two players since one player would have to be 
playing against nature, or chance, not a rational opponent. 
The first occurrence in a game is a move by one of the players 
and is performed by his deciding among alternatives.    There are 
two kinds of moves a player may make:    l) a personal move, where 
he makes a choice by his own free decision,  and 2) a chance »oye, 
whereby some chance device determines the choice for him.    This 
rove is followed by some prescribed situation which is set up in 
the rules and which somehow determines who is to make the next 
rove and what alternatives he may choose from. 
Each player may or may not know the choices his opponent has 
made; he may or may not possess full information.    Herein lies 
another field called information theory.    In games such as chess 
or tic-tac-tce, where each player is fully aware of all previous 
moves by his opponent, the players are said to have perfect 
information. 
Another feature of a game is a terminating rule.    Some 
situation must be defined as ending the game.    Finally, there must 
be a situation describing the payoff or winnings at termination. 
Rapoport sums this up by saying, "A particular game is defined 
when the choices open to the players in each situation, the 
situation defining the end of a play, and the payoffs associated 
2 
with each play-terminating situation have been specified." 
The game theorist is not concerned as much with how to play 
a particular game as he is with analyzing games in general.    He 
is also very much interested in the classification of games into 
different categories.    Games may be classified according to the 
number of players, how many moves the game has, whether the game 
p. 21. 
Anatol Rapoport, Two Person Qarae Theory (Ann Arbor, 1966), 
m 
is finite or infinite, and the amount of information available to 
players.    To say that a game is an n-person game does not necessar- 
ily mean that there are n players.    Bridge,  for example, is 
essentially a two-person game with partners acting as one player. 
Tic-tac-toe may be classified according to the number of moves 
since there are always exactly nine possible moves in this game. 
A finite game has a finite number of moves,   each involving a 
finite number of alternatives from which to chcose.    All other 
games are infinite.    Classification regarding the information 
available to players at any point in the game has been mentioned 
briefly above. 
The most simple game and the one on which most research has 
been conducted is the zero-sum,  two-person game.    A game i3 said 
to be zero-sum if the sum of all payments received by all the 
players at the end of the game is zero.    Expressed mathematically 
in the notation of Von Neumann, if a game has players P-j, P2,...,Pn 
and if pt    (i-1,2,...,n)    is the payment made to P± at the end of 
the play and if /U.P*  " 0, then the play is called zero-aim. 
Furthermore, if every possible play is a zero-sum play, then the 
game itself is said to be zero-sum.    Thus, a zero-sum, two-person 
game is a game with players ^ and Pg where p1 is the payment made 
to P    and p. is the payment made to P   at the end of a play, and 
p. ♦ p   - 0 for each play.    This is saying nothing more than that 
one player's winnings is the other player's losses.    Most often, 
zero-sum games are found in parlor games rather than in economic 
or warfare games where, in winning a particular play, one player 
may gain more than his opponent loses.    A non-zero-sum game has 
an elefiient similar to nature; by some outside doing, what one 
player wins is not the same as what his opponent loses, or vice 
versa. 
The games dealt with in this paper will be zero-sum, two- 
person <?ames.    This means there will be no discussion of coalitions 
for, in a zero-sum,  two-person game, the players are in such direct 
conflict as opponents that the "ethics" of the game prohibit co- 
operation or coalition on the part of the players.    It should be 
mentioned that there is a complete theory of co-operative,  as well 
as non-co-operative games. 
Almost all games are found originally in what the game theorist 
calls extensive form.    This is the sum total of the rules of an 
arbitrary game.    It is the complete and extensive game itself with 
all possible courses of action and every possible sequence of moves. 
Any extensive game in which the two players make their choices from 
alternatives belonging to a finite set is identical   to what is 
called the normal form of the game.    To normalize a game, or to put 
it in normal form, is to find the rectangular game equivalent to 
the extensive form.    One may think of the rectangular form of a 
■ame as a matrix describing the payoffs at each play. 
To completely describe rectangular form of a game, a few 
other definitions are necessary. First, strategy needs to be 
defined.    A strategy for a particular player is a complete plan of 
action throughout the particular game under consideration.    It 
contains much more information than the player will ever need to 
use because it tells him how to act ( that is, specifies his 
behavicr) under all conceivable circumstances of play.    A player 
adopts his strategy before the beginning of the game.    In game 
theory,  since it is assumed that each player is a rational being 
who la out to win, it is also assumed that each player will try 
to clay his best strategy — that he will not deliberately lose a 
game and that he is intelligent enough to be able to adopt such a 
strategy. 
Another definition needed in describing a rectangular game 
is that of matrix, which is often defined as a rectangular array of 
numbers, but which is more meaningfully defined in game theory as 
a real valued function of two variables. Thus, the function f(i,j), 
i = 1,2,...,mj i  - l,2,...,n, is defined by the equation f(i,j) - a±J 
and is represented as the m by n matrix 
• • • s 
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If one considers the function f(i,j) as the payoff function 
for a particular game and if rows 1,2,...m represent alternatives 
from which P-, may choose and columns l,2,...,n represent alterna- 
tives from which P,, may choose (with a      being the payoff to P      if 
he chooses alternative i and P- chooses alternative j), then the 
m by n rectangular array of numbers is called the payoff matrix of 
the game.    If a^ is positive, then Pp pays P.^ that positive amount 
since, as stated above, the numbers in the matrix represent payoffs 
to P    from P?.    This is the usual game-theoretic form.    On the 
other hand,  if an entry is negative,  it represents a positive amount 
paid by Pj to P2.    In other words, P-^ receives a negative payoff. 
A strategy for P.  or P„ includes which particular alternative he 
will choose under all situations.    For example, if P^s strategy 
were (l,0,0,...,0),  then he would be choosing his first alternative 
each time there is a choice to make, and his resulting payoff 
wculd thus be found in the row of the matrix for alternative one: 
*11     a12      a13  ''' al;J   ''* aln*    Whlch 0f theSe " Payoffs he reallv 
receives then depends on whether P    chooses alternatives l,2,...,j, 
..., or n from his collection of alternatives.    It should be 
apparent here why, in rectangular games, the number of alternatives 
open to a player must be finite if a finite optimal strategy is  to 
be found. 
Von Neumann himself defines strategy as a complete plan which 
specifies what choices a player will make in every possible 
situation, for every possible actual information which he might 
possess at that time, and in conformity with the pattern or informa- 
tion which the rules of the game provide for that particular 
situation. 
All of the possible strategies which a player may adopt are 
called his space of strategies; thus, in the n by m matrix,  a 
player's space of strategies is the set cf all n-tuples in which 
the sum of the n terms is one.    A strategy such as the (1,0,0,...,0) 
mentioned above is called a pure strategy for the player is 
choosing the same alternative always.    On the other hand, a 
strategy such as (£,0,£,0,0,...,0,£) is called a mixed strategy 
and states that the player is choosing his first alternative one- 
fcurth of the time, his third alternative one-half of the time, 
and his last alternative one fourth of the time.    This is just 
another way of saying that each element of a player's particular 
n-tuple strategy is the frequency with which he plays that cor- 
responding alternative.    So, for Pj to play pure strategy 1 is 
equivalent to his playing the mixed strategy (x-p ■»•»•*« x^) where 
x   - 1 and xk ■ 0 for each k ^ i.    Sm designates the set of all 
m-tuple strategies open to P^ and SR, the set of all n-tuple strat- 
egies open to P .    P 's strategies are represented by tfft Y2>"-> ?n 
It is obvious that the sum of the elements of each strategy, or 
each n-tuple and each m-tuple, must be one.    Thus,   2^ - 1 and 
hi •u 
Any game characterized by the elements and features previously 
). 
3John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory, of Games 
and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1953), pp. 79-ou. 
described, and found in extensive form,  may be normalized or changed 
into a rectangular game and given a payoff matrix.    The most im- 
portant question the game theorist seeks to answer, after the game 
is in rectangular form, is whether or not there is an optimal way 
of playing.    When Von Neumann proved the Fundamental Theorem for 
Arbitrary Rectangular Games ( which really marked the beginning of 
game theory), this question was answered with a definite yes. 
Before stating this theorem,  it may be profitable to discuss 
briefly a player's expectation function. 
In general, if P    chooses alternative i, he can be assured 
of obtaining at least the minimum payment in the ith row,  that is, 
the rain a...    But since he can choose any row he wants, he can 
j 
make the min a,, . as large as possible.    It must be remembered 
j 
that P    is seeking to make his winnings as great as he can.    There 
is one choice he can make which will give him at least max min a    j 
i    i    1J 
this is the largest of the minimum payments considered by rows. 
In a similar way, P. hopes to minimize his losses.    (It is well to 
think of P 's seeking to maximize gain and P «8 seeking to minimize 
loss since the payoff matrix is written in terms of payoff to 
P. from P .)    If P    chooses alternative j, he can be assured of 
losing not more than the maximum payment in the jth column, or 
max ij-, and by choosing the proper column, he can expect to 
minimize these maximuras, thus finding min max a^.    In summary, 
then, P    is assured of max min a    , and ?2 is assured of min max a^. 
1 i      j      1J J      1 
In any m by n matrix A,  since the matrix can be regarded as a real 
10 
valued function f(i,j) - a    , max ndn a. . £min max a,,. 
The expectation of a player is defined by McKinsey, who says 
that if P, uses mixed strategy X - (x^ x ,   ..., xm) and if P? 
uses mixed strategy I - (y. y?,..., y ), then the mathematical 
» n _ 
expectation of P1 is given by E(X,Y) -  &  3\
a±3 Xi yj*    Thi8 Can 
also be expressed as the product of the two strategies and the 
matrix, E(X,Y) - X«A      •!.    If it happens that, for some X* in P., 's 
mxn 1 
space of strategies and for some Y* in Pg's space of strategies, 
E(X,Y*)*E(X*,Y*)*E(X*,Y) for each X and Y in the respective 
spaces of strategies, then X* and Y* are optimal strategies for 
h 
P, and P , and E(X*,Y«) is called the value of the game. 
If the value of a game is zero, the game is called fair.    If 
v, and v    exist where ▼..   ■ max min E(X,Y) and v? - min max E(X,Y) 
12 1       1     Y *        Y     X 
and if v, and v. are equal, then the condition above is satisfied, 
and the game has value v « ^ - v2, and optimal strategies exist. 
The fundamental theorem guarantees that this will always be true ~ 
that v1 ■ v    in each rectangular game. 
Expressed simply, the fundamental theorem of game theory states 
that every rectangular game has a value and that a player of a 
rectangular game always has an optimal strategy.    Mere formally 
expressed by J. C C. McKinsey:    Let the matrix A equal to 
J. C. C. McKinsey, Introduction to the Theory of Games 
(New York, 1963), pp. 21-25. 
11 
lV 
"in 
mn 
11 
be any matrix, and let the expectation function 
E(X,Y) for any X - (x , r.^..., x ) and any Y - (y , y2»..., yR) 
that are members of S    and S    respectively, be defined as follows: 
E(X.Y) - £.   Ika,, x^ y .    Then the quantities max min E(X,Y) and 
' PI 3 ij    i    j X      Y 
min max E(X,Y) exist and are equal.    A proof of this theorem may be 
Y     X 5 
found in KcKinsey's book. 
Sometimes a same has what is called a saddle point.    A saddle 
point is just a pair of integers (i, j) such that a^ is simulta- 
neously the row minimum and the column maximum or, expressed 
differently, both the maximum of the row rrdnimums and the minimum 
cf the column maximums.    If a matrix has a saddle point at a.       , ■'■oJo 
then the optimal strategies of P1 and Pg are pure strategies of 
playing alternatives iQ and j . Also, f(i0, iQ)  is called the 
value of the game. The chances that a matrix of random numbers will 
have a saddle point decreases rapidly as the deminsion of the 
matrix increases. 
The solution of a rectangular game consists cf X, Y, and the 
value of the game (X and Y here are optimal strategies for P^ and 
P» respectively). Because of the convexity of strategy sets, a 
rectangular game has either Just one solution or infinitely many 
solutions. 
McKinsey, pp. 31-37. 
There are many interesting and important properties of 
optimal strategies,  some of which are investigated,  discussed, 
and proved by McKinsey, who uses Von Neumann's language in many 
instances.    The following theorem, somewhat restated, is dealt 
6 
with by McKinsey I    Let E be the expectation function of an m by n 
rectangular game, and let X* and Y* be members cf Sm and 3 
respectively.    Then the following conditions are equivalent: 
i) X* is an optimal strategy for P    and I* is an optimal 
strategy for P.. 
ii) If X is any member of S    and X is any member of SR, then 
E(X,Y#)£E(X»,Y*)SE(X«,T). 
iii) If i and j are any integers such that lfii*m and 
1 «J*n,  then E(x , Y*)±E(X*,X*)£E(X*, yj).    (x± is 
the member of S    whose ith component is 1, and y. is the 
m v 
member of S    whose jth component is 1.) 
n 
Before going into the application of linear programming theory 
to the solution of games of conflict or strategy, it will be well 
to discuss relations of dominance,  the skew-symmetric game, and the 
strictly determined game. 
A mixed strategy X is said to dominate a mixed strategy X' if, 
for each pure strategy y    for Pg, E(X, yj)CE(X', y^), and there 
exists at least one strategy y. for Pg such that E(X, yj)*E(X', y^), 
In the payoff matrix itself, a pure strategy x± dominates another 
McKinsey, pp. U2,U3. 
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pure strategy x    if each element in the ith row is,  term for term, 
greater than or equal to its corresponding term in the jth row, with 
at least one term being strictly greater than its corresponding 
term.    A similar explanation goes for column dominance except that, 
since P?'s payoffs are expressed as losses, the dominance occurs 
where terms are less than their corresponding terms. 
In solving a game which has dominated rows cr columns, the 
dominated row,  say row i, cr column, say column j, may be deleted 
and a zero substituted in the strategy of P,  in the ith position 
and in the strategy of P. in the jth position, for these dominated 
rows and columns would logically be played none of the time.    Dom- 
inance of this type is called strict dominance.    Non-strict dom- 
inance occurs when, although the elements in a particular row (or 
column) are not all smaller (greater) than the elements in another 
rcw (coluTin), they are all smaller than certain convex linear 
combinations of the corresponding elements of the entries in that 
rcw (column). 
A skew-symmetric matrix always has value zero and is thus always 
a fair game,  since, by definition, a fair game is one with zero 
value.    However,  a game may be fair — that is, it may have value 
zero ~ without    being skew-symmetric.    The optimal strategies in 
a skew-symmetric game are the s?me for both players, and each 
player can avoid loss, no matter what his opponent does, if he 
plays his optimal strategy. 
A strictly determined game is one in which both optimal 
11* 
strategies are pure strategies;   thus,  if a game has a saddle 
point, it is a strictly determined game. 
15 
PART II 
The Linear Programming Method of Solution 
A two by two matrix game can be solved with relative ease 
without the use of linear programming methods. Per instance, 
in the game of matching pennies, where if both players match with 
two heads or two tails, P. wins, and if they fail to match with a 
H       T 
head and a tail, Pg wins, the matrix is 
: [.: i • 
If x equals 
the amount of time P^^ plays heads, then 1 - x represents the amount 
of time he plays tails, and his expectation function E is then 
or 
depending upon whether Pg plays heads or tails.    Performing the 
multiplication, E - x - (l-x) or E - -x + (l-x).    Thus 
E * 2x - 1 or E + -2x + 1, and solving for x, x - \ and (l-x) ■ \. 
Therefore,  the optimal strategy for Px is (£, \).    In like manner, 
this is also the optimal strategy for ?2 because he has expectation 
function 
I' H I.\ "i 
16 
and the solution is the same.    The matrix for Pp is the transpose 
cf the matrix for P .    So each player will be doing best if he plays 
heads one half the time and tails one half the time.    It is here 
that chance may come in because the best way to assure himself that 
Ks opponent will not figure out what he will   do next is to let some 
sort of chance device determine for him whether to play heads or tails 
at each move.    In fact, he could flip a coin to decide for himself. 
After passing two by two matrix games, the number of unknowns 
soon becomes so great that this method is not practical.    Linear 
7 
programming theory here provides an excellent method of solution. 
The method is perhaps best explained by an example.    Suppose the 
game with matrix 
1 
0 
2 
2 
1 
3J 
is to be solved. 
Denoting any strategy for P1 by (x, y, z) so that 
x * y + z - 1 
xKO, y*6,  zfcO, 
P's expectation against any of Pg's three pure strategies are 
be + 2y,    x + 2z, and 2x * y * 3z.    Letting g represent the smallest 
of these three payoffs, Ux + 2y »g,    x + 2y ft g, and 2x + y + 3z*g. 
7 
The following discussion of the simplex method of linear 
programming relies heavily upon Glicksman's Linear Programnlng 
and the Theory of Games. 
In this example all the entries of the original matrix are positive. 
Many times this is not the casej if, however, any entry were 
negative, all entries could be made positive by adding a positive 
quantity equal to the absolute value of the smallest negative entry. 
This   may be done first if there are negative values in the payoff 
matrix.    Adding the same number to each entry in the matrix does 
not affect the optimal strategies of the game; it does,  however, 
change the value of the game by the amount of the number added. 
Dividing the statements x + y + z -1, x?0, y*0, zSO, 
liz + 2ycg, x + 2y»g,  and 2x + y + 3z*g, by g, one gets 
£ + £ + *•£    *B0    y.r0     1 
gglf»f»l»I 
jft+fe.l      S+^el      2x + Z+3zEl> 
g        g "   >    g        g      '      g      g        g 
I *■ 
Player I can maximize g by minimizing g. If the notation x1 - g, 
y     z       1 
y' ■ g, z1 - g, and m - g is introduced, then P wants to find 
x'»0, y* 2 0, and z'z.0 such that 
fUx' ♦ 2y'»l 
x' * 2z' -Z.1 
2x* + y1 + 3z*Xl 
and so that x'  + y' + z« - m is minimized.    This is a full-fledged 
linear programming problem which can be solved by the simplex method. 
Since P2 wants to minimize his payoff, his problem is the 
dual problem of linear programming theory.    Because of the minmax 
theorem,  the solutions to both players' problems can be read from 
the solution matrix of either player's problem.    And since the 
18 
original matrix of the game does not have to be transposed to form 
P.'s problem, his, perhaps,  is the better to  solve. 
If Pp's strategy is denoted by (p, q, r) so that p20, qs0, 
and rSO, the amount P. expects to pay for each of P-i's pure 
strategies is lip + q + 2r, 2p + r, and 2q + 3r. Furthermore, if, 
for each (p, q, r), h is the maximum of these three payoffs, then 
lip + q + 2r^h, 2p + r*-h, and 2q + 3r^h. Dividing as before, 
this time by h, 
E + a + r _ 1 
h* gtO,    f«0,    ^0, and 
Also, Jffl + £ + fc.X|  2E + t »1( and M + 2l-l. 
hhhhh* hh 
Since P    desires to minimize h, he can do this by maximizing h. 
2 E fl £ I 
Letting p'  - h, q' - h, r*  - h, and M - h, Pg wants to find p'«0, 
q'*0, and r'?0 so that 
Up' + q' * 2r'£l 
2p' + r'«l 
2q' + 3r' ftl 
and so that p' ♦ q* + r* ■ M is maximized. 
Thus, from its form,it can be seen that ?2's problem is also 
a linear programing one and is the dual of P^'s problem. 
Putting it into linear programming matrix form tc be handled 
by the simplex method, three slack variables a, b, and c are first 
introduced to change the inequalities to equations.    Then, p'2 0, 
q'»0, r'«0, a *0, b«0, c «0, 
19 
Ip'  • q'  + 2r'  + a - 1 
2p'   + r'  + b - 1 
2q«  + 3r' + c - 1 
and p* * q'  ♦ r1 ■ M is to be maximized. 
This yields the matrix 
[U    1    2    1    0    0    l] 
2    0    10    10    1 
0    2    3    0    0    11 
Ll    1    1    0    0    0    I; 
The three by three submatrix in the upper left corner is the original 
game matrix. 
The simplex method cf solution starts with changing entries 
in the last row so that each element in that row is less than or 
equal   to zero.    One begins, then, by choosing one of the columns 
with last entry greater than zero,  say the first in this example. 
Then, by forming the ratios $ and £, that is, by comparing by 
division the positive numbers in the last column with the cor- 
responding positive numbers in the column chosen and selecting the 
smallest of these ratios, |, a pivot point is found at the entry h. 
C©  1    2    1    0   0   l' 
2    0    10    10   1 
0 2    3    0    0    11 
1 1 1 0 0 0 Mj 
All other elements in this column must be made zero by dividing row 
one by h and then adding to row two -2 times row one, to row three, 
20 
0 times row one, and to row four -1 times TOW cne. 
1 1 1 1 
1 I 
1 
2 I 
1 
0 0 t 
1 
0 "2 0 ~2 1 0 2 
0 2 3 0 0 1 1 
0 I 1 2 _1 h 0 0 1 
Three-fcurths and one-half are both positive numbers in row four, 
sc a pivot point is to be found in the column containing U, or in the 
cne whose last entry is 2.    Taking the third column, 3    2,  so 3 is 
the second pivot point if column three is chosen next. 
Ill 1 
1      5      I      f      9      o      k 
0      "2 0-2 1 0 2 
0 2      Q      0        0 
o     b     2    ~u     o 
1 
0 
1 
1 
Using the same process as before to get all other elements in the 
third column to be zero and the pivot point entry to be cne, the 
resulting matrix is 
1 1 1 l 
1 "12 
1 
0 I 
1 
0 -z 12 
1 
0 
2 
0 "2 1 0 
1 
2 
1 
0 3 1 0 0 3 3 
S_ 1 1 JL 
0 12 0 "I 0 -6 M-12 
Since 12 is the only positive entry remaining in row four, the 
column containing 12,   the second column,   contains the third pivot 
2 
point which can be 3 only.    Thus, a-plying the same method, the 
result is 
0 
0 
1 
0 
21 
1       1 1 t 
i 4 
i 
2 0 
4 -f  o -1 
l 
l t 
l 
2 
1 I 
i 
l 
2 
M - 
Since the first column originally contained the coefficients of 
p', if the entries in the first column of the resulting matrix are 
all zerc excetvt for one, the entry in the last column and the row of 
| 
the cne non-zero entry is the value of p'.    So p'  in this game is 8. 
1 
Likewise, q'  = 2.    Since the r' cclumn does net satisfy the conditions 
previously described,  r1 ■ 0. 
For Player 1, x*, y', and z1 may be read off the solution 
matrix as the negative values of the last entries in the columns 
of the slack variables a, b, and c.    Thus, x' - H, y1 - 0, and 
z' ■ 8.    K equals 8 in this game; since H - h, h, or the value of 
8 8 
the game, is %;  thus g is also 1>.    To find optimal strategies for 
each player,  the substitutions p - p'h, q - q'h, r - r'h, x- x'g, 
y - y'g, z - z*g yield the values p - 5, q 5, r - 0, I, y - 0, 
and z - 5.    So Player l's optimal  strategy is (5, 0, 5), and 
1    h 
Player 2's optimal strategy is G, 5, 0).    Thus the game is solved 
by the simplex method of linear programming.    This same method may 
be employed to solve any rectangular game. 
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PART III      . 
Some Original Games 
The following are original zero-sum,  two-person games, which 
are worthless as far as providing interesting pastimes as games, 
but which may be of some value when considered from the point of 
view cf game theory.    The objective in devising these games was to 
develop a game whose matrix would create a pattern as the dimension 
of the matrix increased,   to generalize the game to an m by n matrix, 
an^ then, after solving the first few games cf small dimension, to 
predict the solution to the m uy n matrix game.    Some success was 
achieved in developing matrices which followed a pattern as their 
dimensions increased and in generalizing a few of the games tc nth 
form, but nc method of predicting a solution to the nth game in 
any one of the examples presented itself.    The games and some 
8 
solutions follow. 
SAME ONE 
Rules 
Player 1 chooses to hold a certain number of cents covered in 
his hand.  (Player 2 knows the total amount of money which Player 1 
possesses at the beginning cf the game.) Player 2 then attempts to 
8 
Some of the games have more than one solution even though 
only one is given. 
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jruess the amount held by Player 1.    If he guesses correctly, he gets 
the amount held.    If he guesses incorrectly, he receives the dif- 
ference between the two amounts provided that both his guess and 
the amount played are as much as or more than one half the total 
amount possessed by Player 1 at the beginning.    Otherwise, Player 1 
<*ets the difference. 
Since this game would be rather meaningless if played with 
only one cent,  the first matrix is the two-cent game. 
[: :] 
For any strategy (x., xrt,..., x ) of Player 1 in this game, x means ■L 2 n 1 
playing one cent, x? means playing two cents, etc. Likewise, in 
any strategy (y , y2,..., y ) for Player 2, y means guessing one 
cent, y means guessing two cents, etc. The solution reached by 
methods described above is 
v ■= -1 
Pl (1' 0) 
P2 (1, 0) 
since there is a saddle point at the first element in the matrix. 
The three-cent game has no saddle point. 
-112 
1 -2      -1 
2 -1      -3 J 
Solution:    v h, p, cfe, h, h), p? (h,h, 15). 
This solution was reached by first setting the problem up as a 
linear programming problem with inequalities.    Before this is done, 
hcwever, it is necessary to add the absolute value of -3, the 
smallest entry in the matrix, to each entry in the matrix sc all 
entries will be positive.    This yields the matrix 
2 h 5 
It 1 2 
5 2 0 
The set of inequalities then is 
f2j> + lq + $r i h 
lip • q + 2r   % h 
5p + 2q * h 
p*0, q2 0, r«0 
and p + q + r * 1 
R 3. 
Dividing each expression by h and letting p' - h, q'  - h, and r' 
f2p« + Uq' + 5r' * 1 
liP» + q' + 2r' * 1 
5p« ♦ 2q' S 1 
lp'«0, q'«0, r**0 
r 
- h, 
and p' + q* • r' - h . 
The next step is to introduce slack variables a, b, and c so 
that the inequalities will be equations. These variables must 
also be positive. 
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2p» + Uq*  + 5r'  + a = 1 
(Up*  + q' + 2r'  + b = 1 
V + 2q'  + c «= 1 
p1    0, q'    0, r1    0, a    0, b    0,  c    0 
pi  + qi + ri  - h « M 
Ihe matrix tc be solved by the simplex method turns cut to be 
"2li5l001 
h       l       2       0       1       0       1 
5200011 
1 1        1 0 0 0        M 
The three-cent game does not have strict dominance, either, 
but some rows and columns are dominated, as the solution reveals. 
-1   1   2   3] 
1-2-1-2 
2 
3 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-1 
2 
-1 
Solution: * - ?, Px (5, 0, 5, 0), P? (£, 5, 0, 0). 
3enerslizing the game now, the n by n matrix takes on one of 
twc forms, depending upbn whether n is an odd or even integer. 
If n is an even integer, the payoff matrix is 
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1 1 2 3 
1 -2 1 2 
2 1 -3 1 
3 2 1 -h 
n 
2 
n-l 
2 "* 
1-3 
n-2 
8-? 
- 2 
n-3 
n i 
--3 
2 J
n-l; . . . 
£-1 n 2 h . ..    n-l 
2~2 2"1 
n 
2      . .    n-2 
1 * 2~3 2 Z 
n 
2-1 .    n-3 
£ i 1 % u .     nJi 
n 
"2 
-1 
n 
"2 
-1 -2       ... 
-a 
2 
*»» -1       ... 
a i 
■ • • 
• • • 
• • • 
(2"1) -df-2)... -n 
But if n is odd, then the matrix is as follows: 
-1 
1 
2 
3 
£3_ 
2 "2 
n 1 
2"2 
E+l 
2 2 
n-l 
1 
-2 
si 
2 2 
a^ 
2 2 
n 1 
2"2 
n-2 
2 
1 
-3 
1 
Si 
2"2 
ai 
2"2 
2 "2 
*_2 
2 2 
S-l 
2 2 
§4 
2 2 
n-3   n-U 
Si n 1 n 1 1 
2"2 2"2 2 2 n-l 
ij a.2 n 1 
2"2 2^ g-g ...      n-2 
Hi U al 
2-2 2 2 2 "2 n-3 
S £ nl S-2 
2-2 
• 
2 "2 
• 
2 2 
• 
n-U 
• 
• 
n 1 
-(2T) 
• 
• 
1 
• 
• 
2 
• 
n'l 
...      2*2 
n 1 n 1 
1 -(2*2) -1 ...   -(2-2) 
a.2 a_2 
2 
• 
-1 
• • 
...   -(2"2) 
• 
• • 
all 
-(2 2) 
• 
• 
n 1 
-(2-2) 
• 
• 
• ••       -n 
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GAME TWO 
This game is almost identical to game one except fcr a slight 
change in the rules, which makes the matrices and solutions quite 
different from those above. 
Rules 
Player 1 chooses to hold in his hand a number of coins. 
(Player 2 knows the total number of cdns Player 1 has at the 
beginning cf the gpme.) Player 2 then tries to guess the number 
cf coins held by Player 1. If both the number held and the number 
guessed are odd integers, or if both are even integers, Player 1 gets 
the difference between the two numbers. If one is odd and the 
ether even, Player 2 gets the difference. 
The two-coin matrix is 
-1   -ll 
[-1   -2 
There is a saddle point at the first entry in the matrix.    Thus,  the 
solution is 
v ■ -1 
P-L  (1,0) 
P2  (1, 0) 
The three-coin matrix takes the form 
-] -1 2l 
-1        -2 1 
2-1-3 
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Again, the*re is a saddle point. This time it is in the first row 
and the second column at -1. The solution here is 
v • ■ -1 
Pl (1,   0,   0) 
P2 (0,  1,  0) 
The four-coin game, 
"-1 -1 2         -3 
-1 -2 -1           2 
2 -1 -3       -1 
-3 2 -1         -h 
has solution, 
-fe 
23  |6 23 23 
P, (llF, 115", 115, 115) 
1 23  U6 23 23.^ 
Pg (115", 115", IB, 115") 
Generalizing in this game,  the n-coin matrix has two forms again, 
depending upon whether or not n is odd or even.    If n is even, the 
first sign in each - and 5 combination in the following matrix applies; 
if n is odd, the second sign applies. 
-1 -1 2 
-1 -2 -1 
2 -1 -3 
-3 2 -1 
• • • 
-(n-2)   7(n-3)    *(n-U) 
+(n-l)    t(n-2)    ?(n-3) 
-3      ... t(n-2) +(n-l) 
2 *(n-3) t(n-2) 
-1 Un-h) *(n-3) 
-it          ... 7(n-5) Un-k) 
• 
• • • 
• 
+(n-5)... -(nil) -[n-(n-l 
-(n-U)..» -[n-(n-D] -n 
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GAiME THREE 
Rules 
Player 1 has a certain quantity of money at the beginning of 
this game. Player 2 always knows exactly how much his opponent 
has. Player 1 chooses to held n cents in his hand. Player 2 then 
tries to guess the amount held by Player 1. He makes his guess. 
Hearing this guess and knowing whether it is right or wrong, 
Player 1 then has the option of either betting that Player 2 has 
made a wrong guess or not betting. (logically, his only reason 
for betting in the case that he knows Player 2 has guessed incor- 
rectly would be tc bluff his opponent.) Player 2, having heard 
whether or not his opponent is betting that he is wrong, then 
decides whether or not he wants to bet that he is right. A summary 
of the Dayoffs is as follows: 
a. Neither bets: 
If Player 2 guesses correctly....Player 2 receives n* 
If Player 2 guesses k^n Player 2 pays (n-k)* 
If Player 2 guesses k*n Player 2 receives (k-n)* 
b. Both bet: 
If Player 2 guesses correctly....Player 2 receives 3n* 
If Player 2 guesses k / n Player 2 receives (|n-k|+l)* 
c. Only Player 1 bets: 
If Player 2 guesses any k Player 2 receives 1* 
d. Only Player 2 bets: 
If Player 2 guesses correctly....Player 2 receives 2ntf 
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If Player 2 guesses k / n Player 2 pays 1# 
Just by reading the rules and observing the payoff schedule, 
one gets the impression that the game is not advantageous to 
Player 1, and it is not. 
In the matrices for this game, the first row strategy means 
playing one cent and not betting; the alternative represented by 
row two means playing one cent and betting, etc.    Likewise, the 
alternative represented by column one means guessing one cent and 
not betting, while column two is guessing one cent and betting, etc. 
The one-crnt game would not be meaningful here, either, since 
there would be no chance for Player 2 to guess incorrectly.    The two- 
cent game is as follows! 
-1 -2 1 1 
-1 -3 -1 -2 
-1 1 -2 -h 
-1 -2 -1 -6 
Eliminating dominated rows and columns, the following matrix 
is the result: 
-1-2 1 
-1        -3        -2 
-1 1        -h 
and adding the absolute value of -h  to each element of the matrix, 
3 2 * 
3 1 2 
3   5  0 
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, 0, £),    P2 (1, 0, 0).    And checking, 
M -1 -1 
-1 
-2 
-3 
1 
1 
-2 -    -1 
-1 -3 
-1 1 
-1 -2 
-2 1 
-1 -3 
The three-coin game is 
-21121 
-1      -2      -1      -3 
-2      Ji        1        1 
_1      _6      -1      -2 
-1        1-3-6 
-1      -2      -1      -9 
Notice that with each one-cent increase in n,  the corresponding 
matrix increases in dimension by two rows and two columns.    Thus, 
arriving at a solution of a game of this size scon becomes impos- 
sible without the use of a computer.    However,  in this matrix, 
since there is dominance, the simplex method is net too complicated. 
The matrix resulting after dominated rows and columns have been 
eleminated is 
T-l        -2 1 1 
1        -2        -U 
-2 1-1 1        -6j 
A solution to  this matrix by the simplex method of linear 
programming is v - 4    ■$ <£ °> b.    P2 <* *• °» °' 0):    ^ th* 
original matrix game v - X    *    fa °> °> °> t 0)' P2 * E.0,0,0,0). 
The matrix for this game played with n cents follows. 
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I j 
rH CM -H 
C                      C                                   C C C 
H       C        rH      ^       H      "»f   •   •    • H      --y   • •    »H CM CM       rr\ 
^-x                    '-x                    «■"-»                                *—» r-» i-H 
T           "V          7                1 £ £ 
rH      v5        Hw        H       ^    •    •    'H       5    . •    .(^ ^ r-4        CM 
CV                 (*>                 «4l                               I _ £7£T,,!:7,,W7,,"rr777 c : J ...:.:         .    . . ; .  9 
•   •    •  ^~»    • •**«         •• •'",**, 
• •          •       H         •      CM                     *         * * T T 
•H                  Jl                   -H       -H C C 
H    T<     H    w    H    <Y • •  *<y    "7*  ■ *  ' M Hf rt    Sf 
iH iH 
I         H          ?        rH           •         rH    •    •    • iH        7     * *    ■*¥ H ^f        7 
•H        7         -H           I         iH          I                        •           I I . '            '. 
• • • 
                        .          1 . ' •           * 
• !!!••                   ,CV • P-\ •      CM 
H        rr,        rH        CM        N£>        <>\    •     •    • r-l       -<f    * *    * r_l ^T T 
•H C C 
CM        H        rH        r-t        <T\       rj)     •    •     »^j-       rH     • •     • >-• rH w        rH 
7 'Y 7 
•H C C 
rH        CM        -3       M3        rH        CM    »    •  .»H       >-j»    * *    * r"1 *"f "       f 
•H C C 
H        H        CM         rp        rH        rH  ••    •    *<f       rH    • «>    *»-f ft        7 
pH 
c 
CM        fr,        rH        CM        H        »    •    •    »H        ijl     * •    »H *-' rH          ^ 
5 f 1 
rj»        H         rH        rH        CM        rH     •    •    -^       rH     • •    «w 7^7, 
CORRECTION 
PRECEDING IMAGE HAS BEEN 
REFILMED 
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY OR TO 
CORRECT A POSSIBLE ERROR 
•1 -2 1 1 2 1 • • .    i-1 1     ...       n-2 1 n-1 1 
1 -3 -1 -2 -1 -3 • • .     -1 -i     ...       -1 -(n-1) -1 -n 
1 ] -2 -k 1 1 • • .    i-2 1    ...      ra-3 1 B-2 1 
1 -2 -3 -6 -1 -2 • • .     -1 -(i-D...   -1 -(n-2) -1 -(n-1) 
2 1 -1 1 -3 -6 •  • .    i-3 1    ...      n-ii 1 n-3 1 
1 -3 -1 -2 -1 -9 • • .     -3 -(i-2)...   -1 -(n-3) -1 -(n-2) 
• • • • • • • •                                           • • • • 
• • • • • • • •                                          • • • • 
(i-l) 
• 
1 -(i-2) 
• 
] 
• 
-(i -3) 
• 
1 • • 
• 
.     -i -2i  ...    n-l-i 1 n-i 1 
1 -i -1 -(i-1) -1 -(i-2) ... -1 -31 ...     -l -(n-i) -1 -(r-i+1) 
• • • • • • • •                                   • • • • 
• • • • • • • •                                   • • • • 
■(n-2) 
• 
1 -(n -3) 
• 
1 -(n -h) 
• 
1 • • .     -(n- .1-1) 
•                                   • 
1    ...      -n -2(n-l) 1 1 
•1 -(n -1) -1 -(n -2) -1 -(n -3) ... 1 -(n-1)... -1 -3 (n-1) -1 -2 
•(n-1) 1 -(n -2) 1 -(n -3) 1 • • .    -<n- ■i) l    ...     -l 1 -n -2n 
•1 -n -1 -(n -1) -1 -(n -2) ...-1 -(n-i+l)~.-l -2 -1 -3n 
Pi 
~"-«»ai. I^^H^HHMjj 
3* 
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